Archives for posts with tag: turtles

This 2005 tax case involved three movies with Ninja in the title. It is also the only federal case with both “ninja” and “zombies” in the opinion – See ZombieLaw: “Astro Zombies in Tax Law” for a prior writeup of this case: Santa Monica Films v. IRS.

SANTA MONICA PICTURES, LLC, PERRY LERNER, TAX MATTERS PARTNER, * Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent CORONA FILM FINANCE FUND, LLC, PERRY LERNER, TAX MATTERS PARTNER, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Nos. 6163-03, 6164-03
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
T.C. Memo 2005-104; 2005 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 104; 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1157

Opinion by Judge Michael Thornton, filed May 11, 2005

The following film titles and development projects were listed in Schedule 1.6(b) of the exchange and contribution agreement as assets of SMHC:

57. Ninja Hunt

58. Ninja Showdown

59. Ninja Squad



All three are listed by the Court as 1987 movies (though IMDB suggests 1986). The Opinion also reveals that they were originally in the “EBD film library”. They were then sold. The Court notes difficulties in determining the market price of movies because of issues finding comparable films. For comparison noting the movie “Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles”.

in 1993, New Line sold 200 features to Turner Broadcasting for $ 500 million ($ 2.5 million per title); … in 1997, Orion/Samuel Goldwyn sold 2,000 features to MGM for $ 573 million ($ 286,500 per title).

[footnote #135]:
The film library that New Line sold to Turner Broadcasting included the film titles: “Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles“, “Misery”, and “City Slickers”. The film library that Orion/Samuel Goldwyn sold to MGM included the Academy Award-winning film titles: “Amadeus”, “Platoon”, “Dances With Wolves”, and “The Silence of the Lambs”.

The point is that these movies are not particularly comparable. The transactions involved shifted the losses from failed movies and were deemed to be a tax shelter. The Court here upholds the IRS ruling over the studio’s arguments.

This is, of course, not the first NinjaLaw Federal case to mention the Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles, nor to mention them even though they are not necessarily relevant to the particularities of the case. Here in 2005, the Turtles movie is listed among a number of modern classics and blockbuster successes.

Alejandro Reyes was convicted of drug related offenses and filed petition for habeas relief alleging that evidence of statements made to police were admitted without proper notice and in violation of Miranda rights. The Court held that statements of pedigree information (“such as the defendant’s name, address, height, weight, age, eye color, and date of birth”) do not require notice or Miranda protections.

ALEJANDRO REYES, Petitioner,
v. DAVID MILLER, Superintendent, Respondent.
98-CV-199H
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12157

Decided – June 23, 1999

Opinion by Judge Carol Heckman:

Detective Grisanti searched another bedroom that was located on the left hand side of a dining room. Inside the bedroom was a statute of a ninja turtle. Detective Grisanti opened the top of the ninja turtle and found sixty-seven bags of heroin. The bags of heroin were wrapped in ten packages. Detective Grisanti testified that the heroin was packaged for sale. He also testified that the street value of the heroin was twenty dollars per bag.

For you math whizzes that’s about $1340 worth of heroin stuffed into a “statue of a ninja turtle”.

Plus “Approximately twenty-two ounces of crack cocaine were found in the bedroom” and “a loaded .38 caliber revolver inside a pocket of a coat that was hanging in the closet”.

The Court denies the petition finding no constitutional violations. But note, two defendants were arrested at the scene and they were tried together but only one was convicted. Is it because of the one’s statement admitting that he lived there? Was he then convicted based largely on his pedigree information while the other defendant was merely found at the scene.

This case joins a growing list of “Ninja Turtle” cases but the first that involves drugs. Previously I had been making a distinction between cases actually about involving Teenage Mutant characters and cases where they seem to be mentioned for no real reason. The case seems more like the latter because the Court did not need to mention the type of statue container. Courts seem to just like to mention the Ninja Turtles whenever possible.

Previous NinjaLaw cases about Ninja Turtles:

First mention of TMNT in Federal Courts
Sun Dun v Coca Cola – August 15, 1991

Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles again – Retromutagen Ooze
Monarch v. Ritam – June 12, 1992

Ninja Turtles and Hollywood’s Horizontal Conspiracy
El Cajon v. AMC – October 23, 1992

First mention of Ninja Turtles in F.Ct. where it’s actually about them
Mirage Studios v. Weng et.al. – April 29, 1994

Burger King Kids Club with Mutant Ninja Turtles – multi-ethnic path to Glee and Celebrity Apprentice
CK Company v. Burger King – September 29, 1994

Ninja Turtles again, this time with FASA’s BattleTech, ExoSquad, RoboTech and Playmates
Fasa v. Playmates – June 19, 1995
(WITH POWER RANGERS)

Spam vs Spa’am with Splinter from TMNT and Pumbaa from Lion King
Hormel Foods v. Jim Henson Productions – September 22, 1995

Ring Pops not utilitarian so trademark protects after patent expired
Topps Company v. Verburg – December 12, 1996

Ninja Turtles as euphemism for Prison Response Team
Clark v. Westchester County – April 30, 1998

In 1994, The Burger King Kids Club teamed up with the Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles to summarily dismiss a claim by the Curious Kids, an unproduced idea that claimed to be the original version of a multi-ethnic, multi-racial cartoon.

CK COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. BURGER KING CORPORATION and SAATCHI & SAATCHI ADVERTISING, INC., Defendants.
92 Civ. 1488 (CSH)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13934; Copy. L. Rep. (CCH) P27,325
Decided – September 29, 1994

Judge Haight for the Court explains:

In this copyright action, defendants move for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff claims that Burger King’s “Kids Club,” a series of child cartoon characters featured in Burger King commercials and in-store promotional materials, infringes on plaintiff’s unproduced proposal for television commercials and specials featuring its own group of child cartoon characters called the “Curious Kids.” Defendants claim that Burger King’s Kids Club lacks any substantial similarity to the protectable elements of the Curious Kids.

The Court continues:

This case presents the familiar copyright question of substantial similarity in the novel context of two groups of multi-ethnic, multi-racial cartoon children.

WAIT, what? HAHA. It’s 1994. And so “multi-ethnic, multi-racial cartoon children” is a “novel context” HA! Dora the Explorer won’t air for another six years.

Explaining the characters in question:

The characters in the Burger King Kids Club, in contrast [to the plaintiff’s characters, the Curious Kids], are extreme stereotypes. The commercials and promotional materials before the Court portray the Kids Club personalities as one-dimensional cartoons. The tone of defendants’ commercials demonstrates the lightweight, playful nature of the Kids Club. While the Curious Kids deal with significant social issues, the Kids Club deals with issues no more weighty than how children can obtain promotional items such as Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtle badges, plastic toy hamburgers, fries, or shakes at participating Burger King restaurants.

Continuing about the Kids Club:

The visual presentation of the Kids Club commercials demonstrates the fundamental differences in tone and structure between the Kids Club and the Curious Kids. The Kids Club commercials rely on special effects and highly stylized graphics. These commercials show the Kids Club members being magically transported in and out of different places, soaring through the air on a flying cheeseburger, ducking to avoid self-propelled french fries and milk shakes that fly into paper bags, and zapping Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles with a stun ray.

Continuing to contrast, the Court notes:

while the Curious Kids wear normal, everyday clothes typical for young teens, the Kids Club members each wear highly stylized outfits exaggerating their stereotypical character type. For example, Kid Vid is outfitted with a plethora of remote controls, headphones, portable stereo equipment, and some type of goggles, and Wheels wears a spacesuit. This magical, high-tech style contrasts with the realistic portrayal of the Curious Kids.

Is that why the Court has twice highlighted the TMNT connection? This is not the first time a Federal Court opinion has unnecessarily mentioned a Ninja Turtle promotional item – See previous NinjaLaw posts about TMNT in cola wars and TMNT in ooze products and TMNT in movie distribution. Is it used in these cases to set the social context or just because judges like ninja turtles? In the Kids Clubs case is it used to further the pronouncement of exaggerated stereotypical character types? Is TMNT, in this way, an early example of multi-ethnic, multi-racial cartoon characters? At the very least they seem to be important supporting characters.

Conclusion of the Court:

Defendants have established that any similarities between the Kids Club and the Curious Kids relate only to unprotectable elements, and that no reasonable jury could find the works substantially similar. Defendants are therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

A rehearing of this case was denied and the appellate court affirmed by the Second Circuit (122 F.3d 1055) without issuing an opinion.

I love when Judges decide that no reasonable jury could find a work similar. In this case the proof of copying was weak, the plaintiff’s characters had never been produced and the connection between the plaintiff’s and Burger King’s advertising agency was tenuous. But the Court does not decide there is no copying, rather that there were no protectable elements of intellectual property. The idea of a group of multi-ethnic, multi-racial characters with one in a wheelchair, is not protectable – or else surely one of these parties might own rights to Glee too.

Note the Court also wrote:

given racial and gender stereotypes of leadership it is unfortunately no surprise that the only white, male, non-handicapped, non-“nerd” member of each group assumes the leadership role. See Selmon v. Hasbro Bradley, Inc., 669 F. Supp. at 1272-73 (not unusual that lion-like creature assigned role of “king of the jungle”).

wheels artie arty glee

burger king kids club glee cartoon

glee cartoon kids club

Judge Haight’s opinion in the Kids Club case has been cited six times for the following propositions:

1) “Copyright law will not protect characters where ‘it is virtually impossible to write about a particular fictional theme without employing certain stock or standard literary devices.’ … theme of diverse group of children sharing adventures unprotectible under copyright law” in Robinson v. Viacom 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9781, Copy. L. Rep. (CCH) P27480 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 1995)

2) “concepts and ideas may not be copyrighted, and that only a particular expression of an idea may be copyrighted.” Proctor and Gamble v. Colgate-Palmolive and Young and Rubicam, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17773 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 1998), citing Robinson v. Viacom, Id.

3) “shared trait, by itself, is insufficient to establish substantial similarity between the characters.” Hogan v. DC Comics, 48 F. Supp. 2d 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) comparing “the main characters in Matchsticks and Dhampire [in] that they share the same name: Nicholas Gaunt”

4) Willis v. HBO, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17887, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1916 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2001) comparing characters in Arli$$ and Schmoozers:

‘The essence of infringement lies in taking not a general theme, but its particular expression through similarities of treatment, details, scenes, events and characterization.’ Reyher, 533 F.2d at 91. ‘The law will not grant an author a monopoly over the unparticularized expression of an idea at such a level of abstraction or generality as unduly to inhibit independent creation by others.’ Gund, Inc. v. Smile Int’l, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 642, 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d mem., 872 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1989). Consistent with these principles, copyright law does not protect stock characters, incidents or settings that are as a practical matter indispensable or standard in the treatment of a given topic. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841, 66 L. Ed. 2d 49, 101 S. Ct. 121 (1980).

5) “concepts and ideas may not be copyrighted and that only a particular expression of an idea may be copyrighted.” CBS Survivor v. ABC Granada, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20258 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2003) comparing Big Brother and Survivor to “I’m a Celebrity get me out of here” in regards to elements like island survival and “serial elimination”. The court finds for Celebrity and thus is born an era of vote-off reality TV shows in the style of Big Brother and Survivor – a style not protectable by copyright. NBC and Donald Trump’s “The Apprentice” premiered the following year.

6) And most recently cited regarding children’s book characters in Lewinson v. Henry Holt & Co., LLC, 659 F. Supp. 2d 547 S.D.N.Y. 2009) “[C]opyright law does not protect stock characters . . . standard in the treatment of a given topic.” “[T]he broad theme of a diverse group of children sharing adventures and experiences is by itself unprotectable under the copyright laws.”

In 1992, El Cajon Cinemas sued AMC (American Multi-Cinema) alleging unfair trade practices preventing it from competing in the first-run movie business. “El Cajon alleges that it was injured by several different forms of defendants’ anticompetitive conduct.” Including: “Horizontal conspiracy, Circuit-Wide Deals, Leverages, Clearances and other Discriminatory allocations”

EL CAJON CINEMAS, INC., a California corporation, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN MULTI-CINEMA, INC.
No. 90 0710 IEG (POR), 90 1408 IEG (POR), 92 0012 IEG (POR) (Consolidated)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19290; 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) P70,038
Decided – October 23, 1992

Explaining the allegations of Circuit-Wide Deals, Judge Gonzales writes:

El Cajon alleges that AMC and Pacific abused the buying power of their large circuits by persuading distributors to license to their theatres nationally rather than on a film by film or theatre by theatre basis in each geographic market. El Cajon cites the Court to the deposition of its film buyer who states that all of the films by all distributors are really licensed in this manner. El Cajon also references another section in its film buyer’s deposition in which the film buyer says that, although he is not sure, he thinks that NINJA TURTLES and WILD AT HEART were distributed on a circuit-wide basis. This alone is not enough to withstand a motion for summary judgment. At the request of El Cajon, the Court will review other evidence submitted by El Cajon relating to alleged circuit-wide deals between Pacific and Orion, and will take this matter under advisement.


Wild at Heart was a 1990 movie by director David Lynch starring Nicolas Cage, Laura Dern and Willem Dafoe. The original Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtle movie was also a 1990 release.

But the Court refused El Cajon’s arguments:

While the Unfair Practices Act makes it unlawful for any person engaged in the production, manufacture, distribution or sale of any article or product for general use or consumption to perform certain acts which the state has determined are anticompetitive, Section 17024 of the Unfair Practices Act provides that the motion picture films when licensed for exhibition to motion picture houses are not articles or products under this chapter. As a matter of law, none of the defendants can be held in violation of the Unfair Practices Act for engaging in the alleged conduct.

El Cajon failed again on a motion for reconsideration decided in 1993. And right now on the internet (google), I can’t find any “El Cajon Cinemas” chain in existence.

Finally, note a recent article, Jan 3, 2012, posted in the Atlantic by Derek Thompson, entitled “Why Do All Movie Tickets Cost the Same?” about movie price fixing. It’s not exactly the same issue as El Cajon faced (Thompson is referring to each movie having the same admit cost, whereas El Cajon was fighting being forced to buy who sets of the distributor’s movies in order to get access to the hot new movies), but it’s all related to the big business takeover of independent cinema in the early 1990’s.

Ninja again being coincidentally(?) being a character of big business racketeering style takeovers. It is humorous to see the ninja turles involvement in this early media war and again recall their involvement in the cola wars.

In the 1992 trademark case of Monarch v Ritam, the Federal Court decided the usage of the word “ooze” or “ooz” in the marketing of a novelty toy product goo. The Court decides that ooze is either generic or descriptive and does not qualify for Lanham Act protections. And for the second time, a federal court cites Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles even though its not really involved in the case.

MONARCH LICENSING, LTD., Plaintiff, -against- RITAM INTERNATIONAL LTD., INC., and BRAVMAN ASSOCIATES, INC., Defendants.
92 Civ. 3108(PNL)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8225; 24 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1456
June 12, 1992, Decided

The Court explains:

Ooz Ball is either a generic unprotectible mark or a descriptive mark which is unprotectible without secondary meaning.

Ordinarily, distinctiveness is a prerequisite to the establishment of trademark rights. Marks that are generic are never protectible. Marks that are descriptive rather than distinctive are protectible only on a showing of “secondary meaning.” See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 – 11 (2d Cir. 1976); Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition §§ 13, 15 (Tent. Draft No. 2 1989) [hereinafter Restatement]

Monarch’s asserted trademark rights attach to the mark “Ooz Ball.” This mark results from the combination of two words: “Ooze” (with the final silent “e” dropped) and “ball.” This mark is used to designate an object which is denoted, or at least described, by those words. The object is delivered in the form of a ball and is intended to be used (at least partially) as a ball (by bouncing it and throwing it). The material of which the ball is composed can properly be called ooze. “Ooze” is a word from Old English which in ancient times referred to the muddy silt characteristically found in the beds of rivers or other bodies of water. From the Old English noun developed the same word as a verb, denoting the action characteristic of such muddy silt; the verb has in [*16] turn influenced the meaning of the noun which has come to include “that which oozes.” See I Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary 1993 (1971). Thus a thick viscous liquid that flows slowly (or oozes) is Ooze.

A strong argument may be made that when this mark is used for this product, it is generic and therefore unprotectible, see Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 9; Restatement § 15; “Ooz Ball” is used in connection with a product that is a ball of ooze, or an ooze ball. As to the dropping of the silent “e,” such HN4Go to this Headnote in the case.spelling changes that do not affect pronunciation ordinarily will not save a generic mark. See, e.g., Leon Finker, Inc. v. Schlussel, 469 F. Supp. 674, 678 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 614 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1979); Restatement, § 14, Comment (a) and § 15, Comment (a); see generally 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 12:12 at 555 – 556 (2d Ed. 1984).

The argument that the mark is generic is strongly supported by the text on the Ooz Ball packaging which, immediately under the trademark Ooz Ball, adds a descriptive line describing the product as a pod of “Intergalactic Ooze.” Also, the instructions on the package advise that if the product dries up, drops of water may be added to restore its “ooz-ability.” The inference is further reinforced by the fact that two other manufacturers of similar products, in addition to Ritam, have used the word ooze as part of the mark and/or description of their product: Dinosaur Ooze and Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles Retromutagen Ooze.

At the very best, this mark sits at the low end of the “descriptive” category. As a descriptive mark, it is not entitled to protection without having achieved secondary meaning in the marketplace. See Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 10.

Monarch has made a very skimpy, conclusory and inadequate showing of secondary meaning. If the mark escapes the generic unprotectible category and is properly considered descriptive, it is, nonetheless, in all probability unprotectible because of inadequate proof of secondary meaning.

Recall that TMNT was cited before in a NinjaLaw case about soda and the cola wars because they made a “cowabunga cooler” product. While this “ooze” case is a more unusual product, it seems there were a lot of these oozes (and Ghostbusters slime) on the market and I think perhaps judges and law clerks like the “ninja turtles” and love the opportunity to mention it as we will see in many future cases as we continue to into NinjaLaw.

There are 103 case opinions in Federal Courts with the word “ninja” according to a Lexis search. The first is actually a typo (explained below). So the true first is the 1988 decision in Hasbro Indus. v. United States, Court No. 84-1-00087, UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, 12 C.I.T. 983; 703 F. Supp. 941, Decided, October 25, 1988

This case involves the import taxes (harmonized tariff) on G.I. Joe action figures and determines that they should be taxed at a higher rate because they are human dolls. This distinction between human and nonhuman figures has recently been reported in a variety of blogs because of a decision regarding X-men merchandise. (See Toy Biz v. US). For similar tax reasons as will be discussed below for Hasbro, Marvel lawyers argued in 2003 that certain X-men figures were nonhuman. This created hullabaloo amongst comic fans because a major plot line of the X-men comic is that these characters are humans who are persecuted for being mutant humans. Arguing that mutants are not human is good for taxes but goes counter to what the X-men fight for.


– Law and Multiverse – “Are the X-Men Human? A Federal Court Says No”
– RadioLab – “X-men vs Tariff Law”
– The Cardozo Jurist – “Courts Rules Marvel Action Figures Are Not Dolls”
– Escapist – “Federal Court Rules that the X-Men are Not Human”

But first the typo – In Office of Supply Govt. of the Republic of Korea v. M. V. Naftoporos, No. 81 Civ. 4507, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15671, September 24, 1985, Decided – the Court cites a quotation to “M. Golodetz Export Corp. v. S/S Lake Ninja, 751 F.2d 1103, 1110 (2d Cir. 1985)” — except that is scrivener’s error – the correct party name of the defendant in that case was “S/S Lake Anja” = the name of a cargo vessel. So that is the first use of “ninja” in the Federal Court but it’s a typo. That said, even if it is complete error, it is somewhat ironic or coincidental that the first case with “ninja” has “the Republic of Korea” as the named plaintiff.

So, now back to the GI Joes case, Hasbro v US, Judge Watson for the Court writes:

This action involves the proper classification of plastic figures described as “G.I. Joe Action Figures” and imported from Hong Kong during 1982 and 1983. The merchandise was classified as “other dolls” under Item 737.24 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States (“TSUS”), at various duty rates, depending upon the date of entry. Plaintiff claims that the importations are properly classifiable as “toy figures of animate objects” under Item A737.40 of the TSUS, which, having met the requirements for duty free treatment under the Generalized System of Preferences, (“GSP”), should be free of duty pursuant to General Headnote 3(c) of the TSUS.

The Court then goes on to give thoroughly enjoyable descriptions of many action figures, particularly:

The third figure selected for description is designed “Counter Intelligence.” This is a white female with red hair, wearing what appears to be a beige, one-piece bathing suit, together with beige boots and gloves over black tights. Molded on the figure is a knife on the left thigh, what is possibly a small explosive device on the right thigh, a grenade on the left shoulder, a small pistol on the inside of the right forearm, and what appear to be two “throwing stars” (a type of weapon associated with Japanese “ninja“) on the exterior of the left glove. The figure comes with a “XK-1 Power Crossbow” accessory.

GI Joe fans will recognize this as a description of Counter Intelligence, Scarlett O’Hara.


The Court quotes the entirety of the back filecards for each character, as in the image above, quoting:

“Scarlett is confident and resilient * * * it’s remarkable that a person so deadly can still retain a sense of humor.”

The Court profiles the action figures and characters of Duke, Roadblock, Doc, Scarlett, Cobra Commander, and Baroness.

Hasbro’s arguments are GI Joe are “action figures” not “dolls” but the Court disagrees concluding:

The testimony offered at trial could not overcome the fundamental definition established by lexicographic common meaning and prior case law. Although it is clear that plaintiff does not use the word “doll” in the marketing of these figures, none of the plaintiff’s witnesses could persuade the Court that this was a matter of basic definition. On the contrary, the evidence as a whole supports the conclusion that the emphasis on the term “action figure” is a conscious avoidance of the definitionally correct term “doll” and that when these articles are described in general publications in this society such as newspapers or magazines, or in specialized publications devoted to collectors of dolls, they are frequently referred to as “dolls.”

In sum, the Court is of the opinion that these figures have been properly classified as “dolls” under Item 737.24 of the TSUS. Further, for what it is worth, the Court notes that this classification does not in any way detract from the respect which these figures deserve as representations of the human participants in the never-ending struggle between good and evil. Henceforth, each and every one of these figures must accept the fact that, for tariff purposes and by judicial decision, they must face the world as “real American dolls.” Hopefully, they will meet this decision as to their tariff classification with courage and pride.

It is my suspicion that this tariff classification for action figure toys is a major reason that Michael Bay’s TMNT will change the narrative to make the Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtle be aliens. Aliens are nonhuman and so they should be taxed at the lower rate. Bay has been quoted today by CNN saying in response to fan reaction about the alien-origin plot: “Relax .. We are just building a richer world”.

Yes, Richer because of tax savings.

Ok that’s enough for my first NinjaLaw post. There are more Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles in other cases and we’ll get to them later – and you may also Shepardize this Hasbro case too, there is a follow-up case about other Joes in 1989 and the 1988 case is also cited in the Toy Biz opinions about X-Men in both 2001 and 2003 . This is just a first post – there will be more NinjaLaw.