Archives for posts with tag: murder

This habeas petitioner was conviction by court-martial of murder with a Ninjatō sword and sentenced to life in prison. The federal courts here affirm the military court judgement.

ninja to sword

CURTIS A. GIBBS, Petitioner,
v.
J. E. THOMAS, Respondent.

1:07-cv-01563-SKO-HC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122152

Decided November 15, 2010, filed November 18, 2010.

Opinion by US Magistrate Judge Sheila K. Oberto:

In the brief there are set forth “[u]ncontested [f]acts” pertinent to the charge, which concerned the premeditated murder of Mrs. Brenda Salomon on August 18, 1989. (Id. at 17.) Petitioner confessed to the killing, revealing that while at the Shipwreck Lounge, he encountered Salomon and then left the lounge. When Petitioner entered his truck, Salomon, who was very drunk, tapped on the window and asked Petitioner to take her out to get something to eat. Petitioner agreed and bought Salomon some fast food. When Salomon passed out several times and failed to tell Petitioner where she lived, Petitioner stopped at a telephone booth and told her to get out of his truck and call someone to come to pick her up. When she called him names, slapped him, and failed to leave the truck, he drove into a wooded area, stopped, and ordered her out of the truck. A physical altercation ensued, and Petitioner pulled Salomon out of the truck. When Salomon removed her shorts, taunted Petitioner, and attacked him as he tried to enter his truck, Petitioner became enraged, hit her repeatedly, retrieved his “Ninja To” sword from the truck, and struck Salomon so hard that the sword’s handle detached from its blade. (Id. at 18, 21-23.) The blow severed her spinal cord and vertical arteries. (Id.)

Petitioner returned to the lounge after retrieving the sword and throwing Salomon’s things out of the truck, and stayed there until closing time. The body was discovered in a wooded area on the Camp Lejeune Marine Corps base, and multiple items of corroborating evidence were found. (Id. at 17-18.)

Petitioner prosecuted as a court martial under military law, impacting this Court’s jurisdiction and scope of review:

In the present case, Petitioner acknowledges that his case was reviewed by both the Navy-Marine Corps of Military Review and the United States Court of Military Appeals. (Pet. 2.)

All of the petitioner’s claims here for habeas relief are denied, some are not ripe because of non-exhausted administrative remedies, regarding alleged prosecutorial misconduct denied because the military court had already looked into it, and no jurisdiction to review military discharge.

This case opinion was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in January 2012, memorandum opinion before Judges Leavy, Tallman and Callahan.

Convicted murderer F.T. Freeman was granted writ of habeas corpus in 2010 by a District Court in Michigan. But the 6th circuit reversed in 2012. The issue is equitable tolling and discovery of attorney drug addiction and major trial mistakes. The “ninja” is reference to an alleged prosecutor’s witness derogatory characterization of the defendant.

FREDERICK THOMAS FREEMAN, Petitioner,
v.
JAN TROMBLEY, Respondent.

Civil No: 07-10350

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN,
SOUTHERN DIVISION

744 F. Supp. 2d 697

FREDERICK THOMAS FREEMAN mugshot

Decided October 14, 2010 by US District Judge Denise Page Hood:

This is a habeas case under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Michigan prisoner Frederick Thomas Freeman, (“Petitioner”), who is confined at the Saginaw Correctional Facility in Freeland, Michigan, has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus through counsel raising the following claims: (1) Petitioner was denied the right to make a record regarding his defense attorney’s drug use; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; (4) prosecutorial misconduct; (5) actual innocence; (6) trial court error in allowing Petitioner to be dressed in prison garb and shackles in the presence of the jury; (7) jury instruction error; and (8) cumulative error. Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder, Mich. Comp. Laws §750.316. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. For the reasons that follow, the petition will be conditionally granted.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner’s conviction arose from the shooting death of Scott Macklem, on November 5, 1986, in the parking lot of St. Clair Community College shortly before 9:00 am. The prosecution theorizes that Mr. Macklem was murdered by Petitioner due to his jealousy of Crystal Merrill and Mr. Macklem’s relationship. Crystal Merrill is the former girlfriend of Petitioner. Ms. Merrill and Mr. Macklem were engaged to be married and were expecting their first child together. Petitioner argues that he did not commit the murder and that he was not at the scene of the shooting. Petitioner produced alibi witnesses at trial to support his theory of the case.

and

Petitioner makes the following claim of prosecutorial misconduct:

The prosecution repeatedly elicited from witnesses such prejudicial but irrelevant material, seeking through these witnesses to portray the Petitioner as a violent man, a ‘Ninja assassin,’ a ‘psychological terrorist.'” Witnesses were asked to describe the Petitioner as “frightening” (e.g. Heidi Bartel, Joplin, and John Manalli) and one who committed violent acts (e.g. Thomas Forde and Paul Demares) all of which had nothing to do with the victim in this case. The prosecution displayed in the courtroom an inflammatory array of items which were never connected to the Petitioner and were never offered in evidence, including guns, knives, and other weapons, martial arts equipment, pornographic magazines and listening devices.

The Court responds that:

None of the questions or answers rise to the level required for prosecutorial misconduct.

Nevertheless, this District Court does grant habeas based on other grounds and orders a new trial (particularly for ineffective assistance of counsel … not just the attorney’s drug use, but as regards preserving right to call an alibi witness and preventing the defendant from testifying on his own behalf). But this writ of habeas corpus is reversed by the 6th Circuit in 2012.

The major issue of the case is the time limit and whether the case deserves equitable tolling. The 6th Circuit before Circuit Judges Martin and McKeague and District Judge Caldwell, sitting by designation, concludes in opinion by Circuit Judge McKeague, May 18, 2012:

Freeman has failed to carry his burden of showing either actual innocence or entitlement to an evidentiary hearing. His petition is time-barred. It follows that the remaining issues presented both by the Warden’s appeal and Freeman’s cross-appeal are rendered moot.

On remand, Writ of habeas corpus denied, Motion denied by: Freeman v. Trombley, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156779 ( E.D. Mich. Oct. 26, 2012) — So that’s only last month — so will this case go on to SCOTUS?

See also this 2007 blog MetroTimes: Reasonable doubt: Part I and Reasonable doubt: Part II By Sandra Svoboda

This 2010 opinion is the denial of habeas petition for a convicted murderer in a drug-related offense.

KEVIN POTTER, Petitioner,
v.
WILLIE SMITH, Respondent.

CASE NO. 2:09-CV-12049

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN,
SOUTHERN DIVISION

2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103088

Decided August 4, 2010, by U.S. Magistrate Judge Paul J. Komives

Petitioner Kevin Potter is a state prisoner, currently confined at the Ionia Maximum Correctional Facility in Ionia, Michigan. On November 11, 2003, petitioner was convicted of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.157a, 750.316, following a jury trial in the Wayne County Circuit Court. On December 9, 2003, he was sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without parole. Petitioner appealed as of right…

The court quotes the trial evidence from the respondent’s answer (so this is the government version of the facts). Three witnesses refer to a man dressed in black and it seems a neighbor witness Beverly Moore used the description “ninja”:

Scott Klass, an electrician, testified that he heard gunshots on the morning of September 19, 2002 and that he saw a man dressed all in black with a rifle and that he saw a van then come down the street, and the van was similar in style to the picture shown to him by the prosecutor. (TT 11/4/03, pp 61-63). Beverly Moore, who lives across the street from the victim’s family, testified that on the morning in question she saw a van parked in front of the Wright house and she wondered why it was blocking their driveway. (TT 11/5/03, pp 8-9). Ms. Moore heard noises but assumed it was firecrackers, but when she went outside she saw a “ninja” all in black with a gun in his hand. (TT 11/5/03, p 13). Another neighbor, Katherine McFarland, also testified about hearing shots and seeing a man all in black with a big, AK 47 type gun in his hands. (TT 11/5/03, pp 39-40).

The facts of this case also involve cocaine, marijuana, an AK-47, and “fire melted” skin. It seems Potter was dressed in black when he killed Mario Allen, on the steps of Mario’s home as Mario left to appear at his sentencing hearing for a drug related crime (a cocaine sale). It seems Mario’s two co-defendents in the drug sale hired Potter to kill Mario so that Mario wouldn’t show up at the sentencing. Then the co-defendants withdrew guilty pleas and prepared to face trial without Mario’s testimony.

In this instant case, Potter is petitioning the federal government for habeas relief but Magistrate Judge Komives finds no violations of federal law, concluding:

In view of the foregoing, the Court should conclude that the state courts’ resolution of petitioner’s claims did not result in a decision which was contrary to, or which involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Accordingly, the Court should deny petitioner’s application for the writ of habeas corpus.

This Magistrate report was adopted by order of District Judge Gerald E. Rosen on September 29, 2010

Recall NinjaLaw#70 = “Murder-for-hire by Los Angeles Ninja Hitman”. As described in that prior post, the case was appealed. Both the district court and appellate opinion were described in the prior post and so this post is a placeholder to keep this 80th NinjaLaw case in sequence.
los angeles

In this case of habeas petition on Los Angeles murder-for-hire, a “Ninja” was convicted based on out of court statements of an unavailable convicted co-conspirator. This is a 2008 appeal on a 1990 conviction of the ninja hitman. The murders in this case have been extensively covered in the press, see for example this 1988 Los Angeles Times article referring to the “Ninja Murders”. And see detailed narrative at TruTv.com, “The Ninja Murder Case” BY Tori Richards

ANTHONY JOSEPH MAJOY, Petitioner,
vs.
ERNEST ROE, Warden, Respondent.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, WESTERN DIVISION
Case No. CV 98-6956-SVW (JWJ); 651 F. Supp. 2d 1065; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112110

Decided March 5, 2008, Opinion by United States Magistrate Judge Jeffrey Johnson

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In 1983, brothers Neil and Stewart Woodman hired hitmen Steven and Robert Homick (also brothers) to murder the Woodmans’ parents. (Resp. Exh. 107, pp. 21-23, 26-27, 36-49, 63-64.) [FN2] The crime was to take place on the night of September 25, 1985, Yom Kippur. (Resp. Exh. 100, pp. 60, 100, 102-03.) The Woodman’s motive was to gain an advantage in a family business dispute (Resp. Exh. 107, pp. 15-21) and to collect on their mother’s $ 500,000 insurance policy — money they needed to pay off business debts (Id. at 15-18).

Late in the evening of September 25, 1985, the Woodman parents were shot and killed in the parking garage of their Brentwood apartment complex. Roger Backman, an independent witness, saw a black-clad individual, later referred to as the “Ninja,” fleeing the scene of the crime. [FN3]

== Footnotes ==
FN2 Unless otherwise specified, all citations to exhibits refer to those introduced by the parties at the evidentiary hearing.
FN3 The assailant was termed the “Ninja” after Mr. Backman described the suspect as wearing a black hooded outfit.

At petitioner’s trial, the prosecution argued that petitioner was the “Ninja” observed by Robert Backman.

After petitioner’s conviction, Stewart Woodman confessed his guilt in exchange for a promise that the prosecution would not seek the death penalty against him.

Here on appeal:

Petitioner argued, inter alia, that the following “new evidence” supported his procedural claim of actual innocence: Michael Dominguez, a key prosecution witness, recanted his testimony implicating petitioner; the police investigation involved questionable methods; the testimony of Robyn Lewis was impeached; and the testimony of Roger Backman likely excludes petitioner as the “Ninja.” (Proposed Findings, pp.18-47.)

Particularly,

petitioner points to the testimony of Roger Backman as evidence that petitioner could not have been the “Ninja.” As detailed above, Mr. Backman described the hooded assailant as resembling Michael Dominguez. While this evidence may suggest that petitioner was not the “Ninja” who came face to face with Mr. Backman, it does not prove that petitioner is innocent of the murders of Gerald and Vera Woodman. It is undisputed that the murders were carried out by more than one individual. In fact, Mr. Backman testified that while he saw the “Ninja,” he heard another individual running through the bushes. Thus, Mr. Backman’s description of the “Ninja” does not support a finding that petitioner was not a participant in the murders.

The Court dismisses the petition, finding that the petitioner cannot show his actual innocence. Ironically, the co-conspirator’s self-interested claims were credible for conviction but the his recantation is not credible for appeal.

None of the other “new” evidence presented by petitioner, without the support of a credible recantation by Dominguez, is sufficient to meet petitioner’s procedural claim of actual innocence.

This opinion was then supplemented and adopted by the District Court Judge Stephen Wilson, August 4, 2009:

ANTHONY JOSEPH MAJOY, Petitioner,
v. ERNEST ROE, Warden, Respondent.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, WESTERN DIVISION
CV 98-6956 SVW (JWJx)
651 F. Supp. 2d 1065; 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70762

Petitioner contends that Dominguez’s recantation should be believed because Dominguez’s initial testimony was the result of police coercion by the Detectives. In his objections, Petitioner claims that the SSRR not only failed to adequately consider the effect of the alleged police coercion on jurors, but goes so far as to “sanction[] egregious police misconduct.” (Obj., at 16.) Specifically, Petitioner insists that the following evidence of Detective Holder’s unethical character was not presented to the jury in Petitioner’s case: (1) Detective Holder suborned perjury of a criminal informant (Siegel) at the first preliminary hearing for defendant Woodman; (2) the Detectives placed a photograph of Petitioner in front of Dominguez during the initial interview “so that [Dominguez] would identify [Petitioner] as the Ninja” (Id.); (3) Detective Holder called Deputy District Attorney John Krayniak a “wimp prosecutor” when Krayniak refused to put untruthful informant Sidney Storch on the witness stand (10/5/04 ERT 89); (4) the Detectives secretly entered into an undisclosed book rights agreement, presumably about the trial; and (5) after leaving the LAPD, Detective Holder obtained a court appointment as a phony expert witness or private investigator in the Woodman trial. (Obj., at 16.)

While Petitioner’s evidence regarding the Detectives may speak to the negative qualities of Detectives Holder and Crostley, and perhaps even suggest that they used questionable interviewing tactics, this evidence does not alter the Court’s conclusion with regard to the credibility of Dominguez’s new testimony. This evidence regarding the Detectives does not allow Petitioner to meet the “extraordinary” burden of a Schlup claim for two reasons. First, the jury watched the interview between the Detectives and Dominguez at trial and, as a result, the jury was given the opportunity to evaluate whether Dominguez was coerced. This Court must examine “new reliable evidence” while evaluating a Schlup claim. 513 U.S. at 324 (emphasis added). Thus, because the placement of the photographs was presented to the jury at trial, Petitioner’s objection standing alone would not cause a new jury to have reasonable doubts. Only Petitioner’s “new” evidence – such as the book deal – could be used in connection with a Schlup claim. Id.

Second, even though Petitioner identifies some other evidence, because Dominguez himself is not credible, this evidence would not cause all reasonable jurors to doubt Petitioner’s conviction. Had the Magistrate concluded that Dominguez was credible during the evidentiary hearings, the evidence of the Detectives’ negative character may have supplemented the Magistrate’s finding that Dominguez was credible. But given that the Magistrate found that Dominguez was not credible, the evidence of the Detectives’ character would not affect reasonable jurors viewing Dominguez’s recantation.

And:

E. Roger Backman’s Testimony

On the night of the murders, Roger Backman witnessed a black-clad “Ninja” outside the murder scene. The prosecutors used this information to claim that Petitioner was the Ninja. At Neil Woodman’s 1994 trial, however, Mr. Backman described the Ninja in such a way “arguably as not only to exclude the middle-aged [Petitioner,] but to implicate the youthful Dominguez.” [FN4] Majoy, 296 F.3d at 774.

== Footnotes ==
FN4 Mr. Backman testified that he identified Dominguez as the Ninja because it was the “most logical[]” choice based on Dominguez’s age, skin tone, and build. Majoy, 296 F.3d at 775.
===

In the SSRR, the Magistrate stated that even if Petitioner was not the Ninja, “Mr. Backman . . . heard another individual running through the bushes. Thus, Mr. Backman’s description of the ‘Ninja‘ does not support a finding that petitioner was not a participant in the murders.” (SSRR at 32-33.) Petitioner objects to the Magistrate’s finding that Petitioner could have been a “noise in the bushes.” (Obj., at 20.) Though the Court agrees with the Magistrate’s analysis of Mr. Backman’s testimony, the SSRR could arguably be interpreted as applying the incorrect standard of review by reaching what could be construed as a factual conclusion. This Court will therefore determine de novo how Mr. Backman’s testimony would affect reasonable jurors. See Majoy, 296 F.3d at 776.

Although Mr. Backman’s 1994 testimony might support Petitioner’s actual innocence claim, the Court concludes that this evidence would not have such an effect on reasonable jurors such that Petitioner would meet the Schlup burden. First, as with Ms. Lewis’s testimony, the California Court of Appeal did not give Mr. Backman’s testimony much weight. The Court of Appeal decision thoroughly analyzed the evidence, and the Court generally agrees with the Court of Appeal’s analysis. After listing the substantial corroborating evidence implicating Petitioner, the Court of Appeal stated: “Finally, independent corroboration [by Backman], no matter how slight in value it might appear to be when standing alone, implicated [Petitioner] in the conspiracy and murders.” People v. Majoy, No. B052619, 38 (Cal.Ct.App. Jan. 27, 1997). As the Court of Appeal decision illustrates, Petitioner’s conviction was based on ample corroborating evidence, which included Mr. Backman’s testimony, even though Mr. Backman’s testimony was of “slight” value. Because Mr. Backman’s testimony was of such slight value, this evidence would not have swayed reasonable jurors to such an extent to satisfy the Schlup actual innocence standard.

Second, in discussing Mr. Backman’s 1994 testimony, the Ninth Circuit stated that “Backman identified . . . the ‘Ninja‘ in such a way arguably as . . . to exclude the middle-aged [Petitioner].” Majoy, 296 F.3d at 774 (emphasis added). Though Mr. Backman’s statements “arguably” excluded Petitioner as the Ninja, there was nothing conclusive about his testimony at the subsequent trials. Mr. Backman admitted he only saw a small part of the Ninja‘s face “between . . . just above [the Ninja‘s] eyebrows and just below the tip of the nose” and that he therefore could not conclusively identify the man. Majoy, 296 F.3d at 775. Mr. Backman’s qualified statements would not cause all reasonable jurors to doubt Petitioner’s conviction.

Even assuming Mr. Backman conclusively exonerated Petitioner as the Ninja, without something more, such as substantial evidence of police coercion or clear reliability of Dominguez’s recantation – both of which are lacking – Petitioner cannot reach the standard that “no reasonable juror would have found [P]etitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Majoy, 296 F.3d at 776.

Because the Court generally agrees with the California Court of Appeal that Mr. Backman’s identification of the Ninja was of little import in upholding Petitioner’s conviction, and because Mr. Backman did not conclusively exonerate Petitioner as the Ninja, Petitioner has failed to meet the heavy burden of a Schlup actual innocence claim.

Concluding:

Roger Backman could not conclusively prove Petitioner was not the Ninja; and, most importantly, Dominguez’s recantation lacked credibility. Because the Ninth Circuit remanded to this Court to determine the credibility of Dominguez’s recantation, and because this Court has determined it was not credible, Petitioner’s Schlup claim must fail. Accordingly, the Court adopts the Magistrate’s SSRR.

This 2007 case is an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 by a Muslim prisoner in Georgia claiming RLUIPA related First Amendment violations while in prison. Specicially, the plaintiff sought 52 books, some with the word “Ninja” in the title. He also had other issues like wearing his Kufi and having a digital version of the Qur’an. This plaintiff has become something of a jailhouse lawyer filing many actions, but also he is still involved in litigation about related incidents from 1995. The word ninja is mentioned only in this decision involving alleged prison guard violations of first amendment and the plaintiff was released from prison (serving a 10 year sentence) before this 2007 case was decided. But in a strange twist, he is back in prison now facing murder charges related to the original crime. The trial is happening like now (?-see update below-) see links below, but first the 2007 RLUIPA ninja case:

WASEEM DAKER, Plaintiff,
v.
JOE FERRERO, et al., Defendants.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA, ATLANTA DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:03-CV-02481-RWS
475 F. Supp. 2d 1325

Decided, February 26, 2007 by Judge Richard Story:

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, initiated this civil action in August 2003 against Defendant Joe Philip Ferrero, Acting Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Corrections (“GDC”), and numerous prison officials. In his Fourth Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts nineteen claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 et seq., challenging aspects of his confinement in various GDC prison facilities. Specifically, Plaintiff challenges: (i) a requirement that he “stand at attention” in the presence of prison officials; (ii) a restriction on his wearing of a Kufi, a traditional article of Muslim headdress; (iii) a denial of his request to possess a digital device containing the text of the Qur’an; (iv) content-based restrictions on the sending and receiving of prisoner mailings and publications; and (v) the sufficiency of the procedures afforded to inmates and senders of mail when prisoners are denied certain mailings and publications. 1 On October 25, 2005, Plaintiff was released from prison, but he continues to pursue this litigation.

explaining:

In his third and eighth allegations, Plaintiff claims that Defendants denied him approximately 52 books on the basis of content in violation of the First Amendment. These books include: (1) The Catalog of Catalogs VI; (2) Mathematical Cryptology; (3) Applied Cryptography; (4) Using Microsoft Visual InterDev; (5) C++ How to Program; (6) Dubugging C++; (7) Night Movements; (8) Inside Kung-Fu; (9) Complete Karate; (10) Far Beyond Defensive Tactics; (11) SAS Training Manual; (12) The Encyclopedia of Survival Techniques; (13) The SAS Guide to Tracking; (14) Ninja: History and Tradition; (15) Ninja: Power of the Mind; (16) Ninja Mind Control; (16) Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America; (17) Revolution by the Book; Different Loving; (18) How to Survive the IRS; (19) Witchcraft: A Secret History; (20) Practical Electronics; (21) Lip Reading Made Easy; (22) HansWehr Arabic English Dictionary; (23) Que Tal?; (24) C++ from the Ground Up; (25) Visual Basic from the Ground Up; (26) Ditch Medicine; (27) Do it Yourself Medicine; (28) The Mammoth Book of Love and Sensuality; (29) The Joy of Sex; (30) Building Bots; (31) Gonzo Gizmos; (32) Booby Trap Identification and Response Guide; (33) Death Investigator’s Handbook and DEA Investigator’s Manual; (34) Georgia Criminal Trial Practice; (35) Georgia Criminal Trial Practice–Forms; (36) Georgia Handbook on Criminal Evidence; (37) Green’s Georgia Law on Evidence; (38) Criminal Investigation: Basic Perspectives; (39) Law Enforcement Technology 260: Criminal Investigation; (40) U.S. Army Special Forces Medical Handbook; (41) Military Book Club Emergency Medical Procedures; (42) The Tao of Sexuality; (43) Ragnar’s Guide to the Underground Economy; (44) Investing Offshore; (45) Electronic Circuits and Secret of an Old-Fashioned Spy; (46) The Black Science: Ancient and Modern Techniques of Ninja Mind Control; (47) The Kama Sutra; (48) Samurai: The World of the Warrior; (49) Leadership Lessons of the Navy Seals; (50) Experiments in Electronic Devices and Circuits; (51) three Fantagraphics books; and (52) Guide to Getting it On. (See Pl.’s Statement of Material Facts [hereinafter “Pl.’s SMF”] PP 15-59.)

Defendants do not dispute that they denied Plaintiff these books. Rather, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he followed the proper procedures in requesting the books, and that, in any event, the books were properly denied on procedural grounds or after a review by a publications review panel. Defendants claim they are therefore entitled to qualified immunity, notwithstanding the reasons for the denial of each individual publication.

Go to this Headnote in the case.Regulations affecting the sending of publications to a prisoner are analyzed under the Turner reasonableness standard. Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 413 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89). Such regulations are valid if they are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.

also,

As another example, Plaintiff claims that on October 26, 2004, two books, The Ninja and Endurance Techniques, were denied to Plaintiff. He claims that he was initially denied an opportunity to appeal, but after filing a grievance relating to that denial, Plaintiff was ostensibly given an opportunity to appeal. Nevertheless, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Hilton Hall “refused to impound the publication for review by the [Publications Review Committee].” After Plaintiff filed another grievance relating to the denial of an opportunity to appeal, Defendant Steve Benton rejected the appeal, stating “only if the facility cannot determine admissibility is the publication to be impounded for further review by the PRC.” (See Pl.’s SMF P 46.) Once again, Defendants “dispute these allegations as written,” without providing any argument or citation to evidence in the record. (See Defs.’ SMF P 46.)

This case decision is on motion for Summary Judgment. The Court granted the motion in part and denied in part. For example the Defendant prison guards were granted summary judgment as related to the wearing of the Kufi. But as to the books, the allegation lived on. But ultimately in subsequent appeal, on a motion to vacate, in the same Court, Judge Story wrote on January 8, 2008, Daker v Chatman, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1192 :

Plaintiff has demonstrated, that reasonable prison officials could disagree over whether certain of these titles pose legitimate security concerns in a prison environment. But that disagreement entitles Defendants to qualified immunity. Unless no reasonable prison official could conclude that any of these publications present a security risk, then the “considerable deference” owed to officials engaged in the “‘inordinately difficult undertaking’ that is modern prison administration” and the robust legal protection afforded to governmental agents, who must be allowed to “carry out their discretionary duties without the fear of personal liability or harassing litigation,” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002), entitles the denying official to qualified immunity. See Duamutef v. Hollins, 297 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2002) (applying “heightened deference” to prison official’s decision to censor publications). For these reasons and for the reasons stated in its Order of August 24, 2007, the Court remains convinced that the denial of these publications was consistent with the protections afforded to prisoners under the First Amendment, see Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 96 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1987), and thus, Plaintiff suffered no constitutional injury. Insofar as Plaintiff moves to vacate this Court’s Order of August 24, 2007, that Motion is DENIED.

Amazingly, this is nowhere near the end of the story. Waseem Daker did get out of prison in 2005 but was re-arrested in 2010 on charges related to the same incidents from 1995. His original imprisonment was related to stalking and assault, and 2010 they arrested him for murder. An order May 9, 2011 by Magistrate Judge E. Clayton Scofield III, in Daker v. Warren, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116451, explains,

At the combined probable cause/bond hearing on February 18, [2010] at which Daker was represented by retained counsel, attorney Brian Steel, the trial court heard testimony from Daker’s brother revealing that Daker (who was born in 1977) has family ties to Syria, where his parents were born and raised. The court also heard that Daker has lived in the Atlanta area since 1990; that after his release from state prison in 2005, following ten years of incarceration, until his arrest in January 2010, he worked in the family business as the general manager of a furniture store and lived with his family, who currently reside in a half-million dollar home; and that he has an expired Canadian passport, although it is unclear whether he has dual citizenship in Canada and the United States. (Probable Cause/Bond Hr’g Tr. at 31-41, ECF No. 4-1 at 39-49.) The state argued that Daker’s family has “large assets” and “connections in Syria, where the family’s from” and where Daker has traveled, and that Daker had “connections to Canada” at some point as well: “He has the ability to flee, he has the connections to flee, he’s a risk of flight.” (Id., Hr’g Tr. at 54-55, ECF No. 4-1 at 62-63.) The trial court ruled as follows: “Well, murder is different . . . [addressing Daker’s attorney], in the sense that somebody’s facing a life sentence, so I think that’s a strong motivation for someone to flee, or to think about fleeing. So, today I’m going to deny bond.” (Id., Hr’g Tr. at 55.) Daker filed a state habeas petition, which was denied on June 24, 2010. The Georgia Supreme Court, on November 3, 2010, denied Daker’s application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal that denial. (Pet. ¶ 10.)

And recently, June 25, 2012, Judge Story denied a variety of Daker’s motions in Daker v. Warren, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87517, including a motion to reconsider bail, and a motion to recuse both Judge Story and Magistrate Judge Scofield, amongst other pretrial motions. The case remained on the docket the next day, but I can’t tell if it went to trial. It seems Daker first parted with his retained attorney nd was then acting pro se, filing all sorts of motions and then the Court took the unusual step of appointed backup counsel, and Daker seemed to allow that counsel to takeover (?) All this back-and-forth may be an attempted tactic. See article in Marietta Daily Journal “Trial of man accused in gruesome 1995 murder delayed 90 days” and in Atlanta Journal New, Cobb County: “Defendant representing himself in 1995 murder case” – But nothing more recent. Does that mean he hasn’t gone to trial yet or did he take an unreported plea?

waseem daker

— UPDATE —
Murder trial of Waseem Daker to begin in September“, Examiner.com, August 25, by Leigh Egan:

jury selection will begin on September 10th. The trial is set to take place at the Cobb County Superior Court.

Daker, 34, was charged in 2010 with the 1995 murder of Karmen Smith. Smith, a Delta flight attendant, was murdered in her Cobb County home. Only a year after the murder took place, Daker was accused of stalking Smith’s roommate. Subsequently, he was convicted and spent ten years in state prison. Although he remained as an person of interest in Smith’s murder, it wasn’t until 2010 that he was charged, based upon DNA evidence that was found at the scene.

Since then, Daker has attempted represent himself after firing several public and private defenders. Recently, however, he agreed to be represented by the law team of Michael and Jason Treadaway.

— UPDATE 2 — 9/9/2012

Murder trial to begin in Cobb woman’s 1995 strangling” by By Andria Simmons in The Atlanta Journal-Constitution

— UPDATE 3 — 9/14/2012
Defendant represents himself in flight attendant murder case” By Andria Simmons in The Atlanta Journal-Constitution
Stalking victim testifies in Cobb murder trial” By Andria Simmons in The Atlanta Journal-Constitution

The story is also being covered by Kim Issa in The Marietta Daily Journal:
“Opening arguments to begin today in E. Cobb murder trial” by Kim Isaza
Murder suspect was urged to get professional help” by Kim Isaza

and Andrew Spencer at WSBradio
Man charged in 1995 Cobb Co. murder representing himself” by Andrew Spencer as WSBradio
Defendant wants new lawyers in 1995 Cobb murder trial” by Andrew Spencer as WSBradio

— UPDATE 4 – 10/1/2012
“Daker sentenced to life plus 47 years” by Andria Simmons for AJC including a quote from the surviving victim, the son of the murdered woman, himself also assaulted and now currently 22 year’s old.

The 2006 opinion affirmed a grant of habeas corpus to a convicted murderer. Richard Joseph was convicted of the 1990 murder of 16-year-old son, Ryan Young. The case involved a “black ninja mask”, evidence found with the dead body and linked to the defendant.


RICHARD JOSEPH, Petitioner-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v.
RALPH COYLE, Warden, Respondent-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

Nos. 05-3111 / 05-3113
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
469 F.3d 441

Decided November 9, 2006, before Circuit Judges Moore, Cole and Clay. The opinion by Judge Karen Moore begins:

An Ohio jury convicted Richard Joseph of aggravated murder. The jury also convicted Joseph of a single capital specification, which made him eligible for the death penalty, and, after a mitigation hearing, recommended a sentence of death. The trial court accepted this recommendation and imposed the death penalty, which was upheld on direct and state post-conviction review. Asserting twenty grounds for relief, Joseph petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court granted the writ on four grounds relating to a fundamental error in the capital specification: although the specification required Joseph to be the principal offender in the commission of the aggravated murder, everyone at trial proceeded under the mistaken view that the specification required Joseph to be the principal offender in the commission of the kidnapping. The district court denied Joseph’s remaining claims. Joseph appeals the denial of six of his sixteen unsuccessful claims, while the state cross-appeals the grant of the writ.

For the reasons discussed below, we AFFIRM the grant of a writ of habeas corpus.

Then quoting facts from from the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision:

Ryan’s body was discovered in a shallow grave. The body was wrapped in Visqueen, the jagged edge of which was matched positively with Visqueen recovered from the job site at Indian Lake where [Joseph] had been working. Under the body, a black ninja mask was recovered. An autopsy revealed that Ryan had superficial lacerations in the area of the throat. Further, Ryan had been stabbed two times in the back – one to the right flank and one at the base of the skull.

And about the materiality and prejudice of suppressed evidence:

All five items of suppressed evidence that were favorable to Joseph were favorable in the sense that they would have impeached Forest. And viewed collectively, these items would have strongly impeached Forest, who was clearly a crucial trial witness for the prosecution. FN22

–FOOTNOTE—
FN22 Forest testified that Joseph and Bulerin had access to Visqueen (the material in which Young’s body was found) at the sand and gravel lot, that Joseph’s and Bulerin’s demeanors were unusual the morning after the kidnapping, that Bulerin changed the tires on Forest’s car the morning after the murder, that a knife was kept in Forest’s car and was in the car on the day of the murder, that Joseph and Bulerin kept a shovel in Forest’s car, and that Joseph owned a black ninja mask like the one discovered near Young’s body

By affirming the grant of habeas petition, the defendant’s death sentence was set aside. Subsequently, writ of certiorari was denied (549 U.S. 1280), and on subsequent state court appeals the remaining life sentence (parole after 20) was affirmed (2008 Ohio 1138), but later remanded in 2010 only for the limited purposes of allowing motion to waive some court costs (125 Ohio St. 3d 76).

Two articles in the Lima Press are noteworthy – the parents of the victim and friends filled the courtroom and the parent were outraged at what they thought was an injustice to not execute their son’s killer:

“You were indicted, convicted by a jury of your peers and sent to death row where you should have died many years ago,” Sharon Young said Wednesday during the resentencing of Richard Joseph for the 1990 murder of their 16-year-old son, Ryan Young. She then criticized the law and justice system for his second chance. “The justice system has failed us and given you, a convicted murderer, another chance in life. Where does the system give Ryan another chance? You did not and neither did the justice system,” she said as she held her husband’s arm while both of them choked back tears. Joseph stared downward at the table in front of him …

In this 2006 decision, another murder conviction habeas petition involving yet another “ninja-type” motorcycle.

John F. Zaffino, Petitioner
v.
Khelleh Konteh, Warden, Respondent

Case No. 5:05CV1485
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO, EASTERN DIVISION

Decided, July 27, 2006, the opinion by Magistrate Judge David Perelman begins:

In this action in habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, petitioner challenges the constitutionality of his March 13, 2003 conviction pursuant to a jury trial of one count of aggravated murder with a firearm specification, upon which he is currently serving a sentence of life imprisonment for aggravated murder and three years incarceration on the firearm specification, to be served consecutively.

Petitioner’s conviction arose consequent to a love triangle, which culminated with Mr. Jeff Zack being fatally shot in the face.

The decision then quotes from the fact findings of the state appellate court review:

The key question for the jury in this case was the identity of the person who rode the motorcycle towards the victim’s automobile and fired the shot, killing him. The state sought to establish that Appellant was the assailant in several ways. First, they established that the motorcycle they were able to recover from Appellant’s ex-wife was, in fact, the motorcycle purchased by Appellant just before the murder.

Next, they produced five individuals who witnessed the motorcycle and rider on the day of the murder. The witnesses all described the motorcycle as being dark, or green and black with some white. According to these witnesses, the motorcycle was consistent with the motorcycle that was admitted into evidence, which was a “ninja-type” motorcycle. The rider was described as wearing dark clothing and a dark helmet with a face-shield.

This decision was adopted (petition dismissed) by US District Judge Peter Economius on August 15, 2006.

Recall other NinjaLaw cases about ninja motorcycles and ninja murderers.

In this 2003 case, “Ninja” is a gang nickname (in 1988) for someone who was going to sell or give guns (“artillery” or “jammies”) to the convicted criminal conspirators. The crime is the execution-style murder of a police officer.

PHILIP COPELAND, Petitioner, – against – HANS G. WALKER, Superintendent, Auburn Correctional Facility, Respondent.
97-CV-2082 (ERK)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
258 F. Supp. 2d 105;

Decided – April 15, 2003

Opinion by Judge Edward R. Korman explains:

In the early morning hours of February 26, 1988, a young, newly appointed New York City Police Officer, Edward Byrne, sitting in his patrol car outside the home of a witness he was assigned to protect, was shot five times in the head from a distance of two feet. Officer Byrne died instantly. The killing was apparently meant to send a message to law enforcement authorities from Howard “Pappy” Mason, one of two Queens drug lords who were incarcerated at the time. Petitioner, Philip Copeland, was convicted by a jury sitting in New York State Supreme Court of carrying out this crime along with his co-defendants Todd Scott, David McClary, and Scott Cobb. Howard “Pappy” Mason was convicted his for his role in the offense.

And:

Petitioner’s role in the planning of this execution-style murder was firmly established through the testimony of Darrell Newby and Martin Howell, who were both members of the drug gang known as the “Beebos,” to which petitioner also belonged (T. 362-63, 527-28, 746, 754). Howell and Newby testified that on February 25, 1988, the night before Officer Byrne was killed, they attended a meeting in an apartment along with petitioner, Todd Scott, and Scott Cobb (T. 369, 370-71, 379). Prior to petitioner’s arrival, Howell heard Scott announce that “the boss had put out an order to hit a cop” (T. 532, 589-90, 591, 593). Scott assured that anyone who participated would receive $ 8,000 in return and would not get caught because “the guy sleeps on the job and it would be easy” (T. 532, 593). Upon petitioner’s arrival at the apartment, Newby (petitioner’s cousin), overheard Todd Scott tell petitioner and Cobb “that we have to kill a police officer regarding a witness” (T. 372, 481-82). Newby then observed both petitioner and Cobb nod their heads “up and down” in response to Scott’s remark (T. 374, 460, 464). Howell also overheard petitioner ask Scott if he had the “jammies,” or guns (T. 602, 664, 717, 727). Scott replied that he was going to get the “artillery” from “Ninja” (T. 603). Howell then heard petitioner say to Cobb, “We’re going to use your car” (T. 537, 603).

Petitioner’s complicity in the conspiracy to murder Officer Byrne is further evidenced by statements made both before the planning session and after the killing. Howell testified that earlier on February 25, petitioner declared to him that “the [*120] Boss [Pappy Mason] was very pissed off and he wanted to see it on TV while he was on Riker’s Island that a cop got iced” (T. 763-64, 770). In addition, the morning following the shooting Scott Cobb confessed to Newby that “We killed the cop” (T. 508, 521). That same day, Cobb told Howell, in petitioner’s presence, how two cars had been used in the “hit” — one car was “dumped” while the other was used to take the participants to a party in Manhattan after the killing (T. 576, 740-41). Howell also heard petitioner tell Cobb that he did not want to hear anymore about “the situation” (T. 577, 665, 743). On the Monday following the crime, Newby also overheard Scott Cobb confess to a third person that he had pulled up behind the police officer’s car and shot him (T. 508-09). Finally, on the Saturday following the shooting when some money was missing from the profits of drug sales, petitioner warned Howell and others that “if you all want to end up like that MF-ing cop, then that money better turn up” (T. 764-65).

In addition to this testimonial evidence, the prosecution also presented physical evidence linking petitioner to the crime. Specifically, petitioner’s fingerprint was found on an Econo-Lodge scratch pad, which was recovered from the yellow car used by the perpetrators (T. 942, 1490, 1732). Based on this evidence, a rational juror could certainly conclude that petitioner was guilty of intentional murder.

The Court here denies the petition for habeas corpus and denies certificate of appealability.

Recall also, this is the second time we’ve seen Ninja as a gang member’s nickname in Federal Court.

Richard Allen Jackson raped and killed a woman. When arrested he waived Miranda and confessed completely. Substantial corroborating evidence was found at his home. He was sentenced to death. But then a judge reversed saying the confession should be barred. Instead of a new trial, he plead guilty to lesser crimes with agreement to serve 30 years. But no one told him that he could face federal charges too. And he did. And he was sentenced to death again. Below, the Federal appeal. He lost. Jackson is currently on Federal Death Row awaiting execution.

Richard Allen Jackson


UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD ALLEN JACKSON, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 01-9
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
327 F.3d 273
; 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 4834; 60 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (Callaghan) 1319
September 23, 2002, Argued
March 18, 2003, Decided

The opinion by Judge Niemeyer describes the horrific incident and the procedural history prior to this appeal:

On Halloween morning, October 31, 1994, Karen Styles, a recent college graduate, disappeared from a trail in the Pisgah National Forest. A search initiated that evening, after Styles failed to return home, revealed no trace of Styles herself. Her car was, however, still parked at the lot at the head of the trail, and her car key was found on the trail two-tenths of a mile from the parking lot.

A little more than three weeks later, Styles’ nude body was discovered by a hunter, duct-taped to a tree, where investigators also found a duct-tape wrapper, a pornographic magazine, and one spent Remington .22 caliber rifle casing. An autopsy revealed that Styles died from a single bullet wound to the head. She also had suffered ten stun-gun wounds to her body, nine of them inflicted within six inches of her pubic area. Investigators recognized from the duct-tape wrapper that the brand was sold at K-Mart. When sheriff’s deputies contacted the nearest K-Mart store, located approximately one mile from the murder site, they discovered a receipt for a transaction that occurred on October 28, 1994, evidencing the purchase of a .22 rifle, a box of Remington .22 rifle ammunition, duct tape, a flashlight, and batteries. The ATF Form 4473 generated upon the purchase of the rifle revealed the purchaser to be Richard Allen Jackson.

On December 20, 1994, Jackson voluntarily accompanied police to the Buncombe County Sheriff’s Department for an interview. After the officers advised Jackson of his Miranda rights, Jackson waived them and answered questions for approximately three hours about his background and his whereabouts in the days surrounding the date of Styles’ murder. When the sheriff asked Jackson what he did with the rifle that he used to shoot Karen Styles, Jackson responded, “I think I need a lawyer present.” The sheriff then informed Jackson that he would not ask him any more questions and stated, “Son, I know you bought the rifle and the duct tape at K-Mart on the 28th of October. I know you were in Bent Creek on the day she was killed, and that’s fine, but you need help.” At this point Jackson broke down, crying and insisting that he did not mean to kill anybody. After the officers informed Jackson that he did not need to say anything because he had invoked his right to counsel, Jackson stated that he wanted to tell the whole story to get it off of his chest. He then signed another waiver of his Miranda rights.

Jackson confessed fully. He stated that he arrived at the park around 8:00 a.m. and watched Styles as she stretched and walked down the trail. After sitting for a while, he took the gun out of the back of the car, loaded it, and started down the trail. He also had duct tape, a stun gun, and a pornographic magazine in his coat pockets. After Karen Styles passed him on the trail, Jackson turned around and pointed the gun at her, whereupon Styles took a key out of her shoe and told Jackson that there was money in her car and that he could take the car. She pleaded with him not to hurt her. Jackson placed duct tape over Styles’ eyes and mouth and led her to a remote area, where he stood her with her back to a tree and duct-taped her to the tree. The duct tape on Styles’ mouth had come loose by this time, and Styles again asked him not to hurt her. Jackson taped her mouth shut again, ripped off her shorts and underpants, and then raped her vaginally. Although Jackson’s rendition did not describe his use of the stun gun, evidence was presented at trial that he shocked Styles with a stun gun once above her left breast and several times in the pubic area. Jackson stated that he then moved away from Styles and looked at his pornographic magazine while masturbating. The tape over Styles’ mouth loosened, and Styles began screaming. Jackson walked up to her, put the gun to her head, and shot her once. That afternoon, Jackson went back to the K-Mart, returned the gun, and received a refund.

Jackson was crying during his entire confession, and the report of his confession indicates that at times during the interview the officers could not understand his words. Jackson repeated many times that he did not mean to kill Styles.

A search of Jackson’s home and cars, conducted pursuant to a search warrant, led investigators to recover a functional stun gun, a flashlight, a black “Ninja” outfit, a wrapper to an adult magazine, and a partially empty box of .22 caliber rifle bullets.

Jackson was charged in Buncombe County with first-degree murder, first-degree kidnapping, and first-degree rape. After the trial court denied Jackson’s pretrial motion to suppress his confession, a jury returned a guilty verdict on all three charges. On the jury’s recommendation, the court imposed the death penalty for the murder conviction and prison sentences for the rape and kidnapping convictions. On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed Jackson’s conviction and ordered a new trial, concluding that police had violated Jackson’s Miranda right not to be interrogated after he had invoked his right to counsel. State v. Jackson, 348 N.C. 52, 497 S.E.2d 409, 412 (N.C. 1998).

On March 3, 2000, Jackson pled guilty in State court to second degree murder, first-degree rape, and second-degree kidnapping. The stipulated prison sentences in the agreement totaled over 31 years, and Jackson received credit for 5 years already served. At the time of Jackson’s plea, none of his lawyers considered the possibility of a federal prosecution, and none advised Jackson that he could be subject to federal prosecution.

On November 6, 2000, a federal grand jury returned a superseding bill of indictment charging Jackson, in one count, of using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, specifically murder, kidnapping, and aggravated sexual abuse, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(j)(1). At trial, the government called 22 witnesses during the guilt phase and introduced extensive physical and testimonial evidence, including Jackson’s confession, which was received without objection. The jury returned a guilty verdict and then proceeded to consider the appropriate sentence.

During the sentencing phase, the government presented the testimony of the victim’s mother, Kathleen Styles, and the defense presented the testimony of Jackson’s adoptive mother, Sally Jackson. The defense also attempted to offer the testimony of the adoptive parents of Jackson’s natural sister, who suffered behavioral disorders, but the district court did not allow this testimony without any expert testimony linking the sister’s mental condition to Jackson’s. To rebut Sally Jackson’s testimony, the government played for the jury, over Jackson’s objection, portions of a videotaped interview given by Jackson for FOX News in October 2000, after his State conviction had been reversed and he had been sentenced pursuant to a guilty plea. The jury found unanimously that the government had proved beyond a reasonable doubt four aggravating factors, including the fact that Karen Styles’ death occurred during the commission of the offense of kidnapping, as defined under 18 U.S.C. § 1201, and the fact that Jackson committed the crime in an “especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse to Karen Styles.” Various jurors found 14 mitigating circumstances, and the jury found unanimously that “the aggravating factor or factors found to exist sufficiently outweighed all the mitigating factor or factors found to exist to justify a death sentence.” All 12 jurors signed the verdict form, unanimously recommending that Jackson be sentenced to death.

In accordance with that recommendation, the district court entered judgment on May 14, 2001, finding Jackson guilty of the offense charged in the indictment and imposing the sentence of death. The judgment also provided: “This judgment is effective immediately and is neither consecutive to nor delayed by the judgment and sentence previously imposed by the State of North Carolina.”

The Court finds no reversible error and upholds the conviction and death sentence. US Supreme Court certiorari denied, 124 S. Ct. 566 (2003).

Recall also the NinjaLaw case of the Ninja-pants killer. Also from North Carolina, and also currently awaiting death sentence in Federal Death Row. It is unclear when either of these people might be executed.

karen styles grave