Archives for posts with tag: black ninja

This 2009 habeas petition was denied by United States Magistrate Judge Robert C. Mitchell. The opinion quoted four uses of the word “ninja” from the lower court and from petitioner’s arguments. These refer to a “ninja sword and nunchucks” and a “black ninja outfit”.

Michale J. Anderson, an inmate at the State Correctional Institution at Houtzdale has presented a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. For the reasons set forth below, the petition will be dismissed and because reasonable jurists could not conclude that a reasonable basis for appeal exists, a certificate of appealability will be denied.

MICHALE J. ANDERSON, BH-9234, Petitioner,
v.
SUPERINTENDENT BRITTON, et al., Respondents.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Civil Action No. 09-113
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45455

Decided June 1, 2009

The background to this prosecution is set forth in the February 3, 2000 Memorandum of the Superior Court:

In the early morning hours of October 27, 1989, Anderson took a taxicab to the home of the victim, Karen Hurwitz (“Hurwitz”). On his way to Hurwitz’s home, Anderson had the cab stop in the Highland Park area where he retrieved a bag containing various weapons. After arriving at the Hurwitz residence, Anderson removed a Ninja sword and nunchucks from his bag and placed them at the side of the house. Anderson also placed another weapon inside his jacket. Anderson then went into the Hurwitz home.

After speaking with Hurwitz for a few moments, Anderson and Hurwitz agreed to continue their conversation outside so as not to awaken Hurwitz’s parents. Once outside, Anderson picked up the Ninja sword and walked with the victim to a gazebo in her yard. As the two conversed, Anderson struck the victim in the head with the ninja sword and repeatedly stabbed her in the torso. When the victim stopped moving, Anderson went into the Hurwitz home, took the keys to the Hurwitz’s automobile, and drove away in the vehicle.

The next morning, Anderson voluntarily accompanied police officers from his high school to police headquarters. Upon arriving at headquarters, Anderson confessed to the aforementioned crimes.

and

In his post-conviction petition to the Superior Court, the petitioner framed this issue as follows:

At Mr. Anderson’s trial Katherine Berlin testified that she was the girlfriend of Mr. Anderson (TT.222-223). Berlin saw Mr. Anderson on a nearly daily basis in the months prior to Hurwitz’s killing (TT.224-225). Mr. Anderson began sleeping at Berlin’s residence albeit without the knowledge of Berlin’s parents (TT.223). Berlin’s bedroom was on the first floor and her parent’s on the second floor (TT.225). Mr. Anderson brought various packaged personal items in bags and boxes, which Berlin kept, under her piano.

At trial Berlin was shown 3 boxes belonging to Mr. Anderson, one of which had marked on it: “mixed stuff, don’t touch”. Berlin never opened the box (TT.227). According to Berlin, Mr. Anderson came to Berlin’s residence on October 26, 1989, changed his clothing and put them in a bag under the piano (TT.233).

At trial Detective Terrance P. O’Leary testified that he had recovered a black ninja suit from Mr. Anderson’s backpack located at Berlin’s residence (TT.303). He also recovered stars and literature from boxes at Berlin’s residence (TT.303). Three of Mr. Anderson’s boxes recovered from Berlin’s apartment contained Mr. Anderson’s clothing and personal items (TT.305). Found also in the boxes were three American Flags: Exhibits 65,66, and 67; On Exhibit 65 was hand printed: “Niggers, spics, Jewish pigs will rape America no more. These will not be the first”; On Exhibit 66 was written: “Long live the white. Fuck the Jews. These will not be the first.” TT.307. The Commonwealth argued that the seized items in question went to Mr. Anderson’s state of mind and were thus admissible (TT.307).

As post-conviction appellate counsel argued, at trial the admissibility of this evidence was argued, but counsel never asserted the petitioner’s Fourth Amendment rights regarding these articles. Additionally, it is argued that no warrant was secured for these items; Anderson had not given his consent for their seizure and the items were delivered to the police by Ms. Berlin’s father who had no knowledge that the petitioner was residing in his house. Thus, the question was whether or not petitioner enjoyed a reasonable expectation of privacy in these items and as a result whether his Fourth Amendment rights were violated.

Therefore

An appropriate Order will be entered.

ORDER

AND NOW, this 1st day of June, 2009, for the reasons set forth in the foregoing Memorandum, the petition for Michael J. Anderson for a writ of habeas corpus is dismissed and because reasonable jurists could not conclude that a basis for appeal exists, a certificate of appealability is denied.

/s/ Robert C. Mitchell

United States Magistrate Judge

Advertisements

After his conviction for possession of burglary tools, Mark Thomas sued Nebraska Police Officers (particularly Officer Griss) for planting the evidence. Thomas was arrested for not paying his hotel bill and so theft of services from the hotel. He was arrested in the hotel lobby. Evidence obtained from a bag taken from the hotel room included:

a Pickmaster lock kit containing lock-picking equipment, a lock pick gun, toe nail clippers, a Swiss army knife, a black ninja hood, a pair of black leather gloves, and other items.

MARK C. THOMAS, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. DALE HUNGERFORD, Individually and in his official capacity as police officer for the city of Kearney, Nebraska; MICHAEL KIRKWOOD, Individually and in his official capacity as police officer for the city of Kearney, Nebraska, Defendants, JEFF GRISS, Individually and in his official capacity as police officer for the city of Kearney, Nebraska, Defendant/Appellant.
No. 93-3232
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
23 F.3d 1450

Filed – May 11, 1994

Thomas’s amended complaint as stating a cause of action against Griss on two grounds: that Griss had conducted an inventory search of Thomas’s duffel bag that was not in accordance with established procedures, and that Griss had planted the black ninja hood and the “o” ring in the duffel bag. The district court denied Griss’s motion for summary judgment, and this appeal followed.

Noting in footnote #1:

Although the denial of a summary judgment motion is not a final judgment, a district court’s denial of a qualified immunity claim is an immediately appealable “final decision” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

Reversing:

The order denying Griss’s summary judgment motion is reversed, and the case is remanded to the district court for entry of judgment dismissing the complaint.

Explaining about the planted evidence:

The district court also denied Griss’s motion for summary judgment on Thomas’s claim that Griss planted a black ninja hood and an “o” ring in Thomas’s duffel bag. The magistrate judge construed Thomas’s complaint to allege that because the hood and “o” ring did not appear on Ward’s inventory form, Griss must have planted the items. Griss argues that he is absolutely immune from this claim because the allegation that he planted evidence is simply an assertion that he committed perjury when he testified at Thomas’s trial about the events surrounding Thomas’s arrest. Thomas concedes that Griss would be entitled to absolute immunity on such a claim, for officers are absolutely immune from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages arising out of their alleged perjurious testimony at trial. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 342, 75 L. Ed. 2d 96, 103 S. Ct. 1108 (1983). Thomas argues, however, that Griss did more than perjure himself, contending that Griss planted some of the evidence that the prosecutor used against him. Although absolute immunity may not shield Griss against such a claim, the district court should nevertheless have granted Griss’s summary judgment motion.

The inventory search was also found acceptable and not a violation of the Fourth Amendment, at least in part because the defendant himself asked to have the contents of the bag inventoried.

I think an “o” ring is a metal piece from a lock (in this case “a Kawneer-brand lock”) that can be used for breaking glass like car windows (see similarly Ninja rocks which will be mentioned in future case). But what makes a “black ninja hood” different from a mere black hood or black hood mask, this is not entirely clear to me, other than to further implicate that the defendant’s possessions are burglary tools. As if the tools themselves have intent, and this hood intended to be ninja.